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ABSTRACT: In an often-quoted passage, Richard Rorty wrote that
“J.S. Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to optimizing
the balance between leaving people’s lives alone and preventing suffering
seems to me pretty much the last word.” In this Article, I show why, for
Rorty, maintaining a strong public-private divide that cordons off final
vocabularies—the religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, philosophical,
and other terms so important for citizens’ private pursuits of self-creation
and self-perfection—from public political discourse is a crucial means to
accomplishing both of these goals in post-secular liberal democracies.
Public political justifications should instead be articulated in the foundationneutral terms of a shared national vocabulary.

Like paintbrushes and

crowbars, final and shared vocabularies are different tools for different
purposes, and a strong public-private divide helps ensure that no harm
comes from their misuse.
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INTRODUCTION
The Enlightenment liberal erected a public-private divide to preserve
the rule of law by quarantining the subjective influences of religious faith
and individual caprice from public political discourse. The idea was to
avoid conflict and ensure legitimacy by limiting public political justification
to only neutral, “secular” reasons. 1 For the Enlightenment liberal, this
meant limiting political justification to reasons anchored in the terra firma
of an objective, universal moral order that is rationally demonstrable from
the essential nature of human beings.
Over the last hundred and fifty years or so, however, the West has
increasingly been forced to face the contingency of its theoretical
foundations in secular reason. Even liberalism’s defining commitment to
the values of freedom and equality is now commonly traced to historical,

1

See, e.g., Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Why We Should Reject What Liberalis m Tells Us

about Speaking and Acting for Relig ious Reasons ”, in Religion and Contemporary
Liberalism, edited by Paul J. Weithman (University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 167 (The
En lightenment liberal was convinced that the “only way to forestall relig ious wars is to get
people to stop invoking God and to stop invoking canonical scriptures when arguing and
determining politics.”).
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rather than rational, antecedents. I refer to a liberalism that faces this
contingency as “post-secular.”
Liberalism’s historical public-private divide must be rethought and
perhaps reconsidered in a post-secular world. Once comprehensive secular
theories of identity, right, and good are denied their claim to objectivity,
there is no longer any principled justification for elevating them to a
privileged status in public political discourse. This has led many to argue
that the liberal public-private divide must be cast aside, allowing for open
competition among all foundational justifications for the use of political
power in the public political forum, whether they be religious, ethnic, racial,
sexual, gender, philosophical, or other. 2 Variations of this approach to
2

For some defenses of this open competition model, see, e.g., Stephen L Carter, The

Culture of Disbelief (Anchor Books, 1994); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and
Political Choice (New York: Oxford, 1988); Scott C. Idleman, “The Concealment of
Relig ious Values in Judicial Decision Making,” Virginia Law Review 91 (2005): 515; Mark
Modak-Truran, “Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision
Making”, Catholic University Law Review, 53 (2004): 709; M ichael Perry, “Religious
Morality and Polit ical Choice: Further Thoughts —and Second Thoughts—on Love and
Power,” San Diego law Review 30 (1993): 703. See also, Timothy Jackson’s “The Return
of the Prodigal? Liberal Theory and Religious Pluralism,” Sanford Levinson’s “Abstinence
and Exclusion: What Does Liberalis m Demand of the Religiously Oriented (Would Be)
Judge?,” Philip Quinn’s, “Po lit ical Liberalis ms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” and
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s, “Why We Should Reject What Liberalis m Tells Us About
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politics have been identified under a number of labels—“multiculturalism,”
“the politics of difference,” “the politics of recognition,” “cultural politics,”
or “identity politics”—but I refer it more generally as the open competition
model.
Richard Rorty saw things differently. For Rorty, the post-secular
world signals liberalism’s coming of age. It puts liberal democracies in a
position to “throw away some of the ladders used in their own construction”
and to free themselves from Enlightenment foundationalism altogether. 3 In
this spirit, Rorty argues that the best way to address the contingency of
comprehensive secular justifications in a post-secular world is to force them
onto the private side of the private-public divide, not to eliminate the divide
itself. 4 This strategy has the effect of limiting public political discourse to
Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons ,” collected in Religion and
Contemporary Liberalism, Paul J. Weith man, ed. (South Bend: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2009).
3

Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and So lidarity (Camb ridge University Press,

1989), 194.
4

There is little consensus on where Rorty would draw the line between the public and

the private, and Rorty was never exp licit on this point. Some suggest that Rorty regarded
any arguments concerning politics that are offered to the general public should be regulated
by the public-private divide.

See, e.g., Nicholas Wolterstorff, “An Engagement with

Rorty,” in Understanding Liberal Democracy (Oxford, 2012), p. 47.

And there are

passages in Rorty that lend credence to this expansive interpretation.

I have always
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only “freestanding,”5 foundation-neutral reasons—what Rorty referred to as
a political society’s “shared vocabulary” 6 and what John Rawls referred to
as its “public reason.”7 I refer to this approach to politics as the foundationneutral model for politics.

understood Rorty to advocate a much more limited scope for the public side of the divide,
something along the lines of what John Rawls understood to be the limits of public reason.
On this view, the public-private divide regulates only public political discourse concerning
the constitutional essentials of a society by citizens who are acting in some o fficial capacity
(e.g., as a government official, representative, or judge) or when voting. See, e.g., John
Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition, 211-54 (Colu mbia, 2005). On this view,
not all political subjects are regulated by the public private div ide (only those that pertain
to constitutional essentials), and discussion of even constitutional essentials is not regulated
by the divide when they take place in civ il society. That said, since the willingness to offer
public (i.e., foundation-neutral) reasons for controversial positions in even civil society is a
virtue in a liberal society because it reflects a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect. I
think it is fair to identify Rorty’s conception of the scope of the public sphere with Rawls’s
because Rorty constantly relies on Rawls in art iculating his own defense of the publicprivate divide. See generally, Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,”
in Ob jectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge Un iversity Press, 1991), at pp. 175-196.
In any event, it is certainly safe to say that Rorty would include Rawls’s conception of the
public within his own, even if he would have preferred that it be expanded still further.
5

See, e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalis m, 13.

6

Rorty, Contingency, xv i.

7

See, e.g., John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Political
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Rorty was adamant that, even in a post-secular world, maintaining a
strong private-public divide under the foundation- neutral model is crucial to
promoting and protecting the values we cherish most in the West: (1) the
freedom of the individual to engage in private projects of self-creation and
self-perfection under (2) social institutions that reflect a spirit of equality,
cooperation, and mutual respect. While private foundational reasons that
rely crucially on religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, or philosophical
identity may be crucial to our projects of self-creation and self-perfection,
they would be counterproductive if applied to the public tasks of promoting
equality, cooperation, and mutual respect. Similarly, while a society’s
shared vocabulary is well- suited to the tasks of constructing and promoting
a just constitutional order, as freestanding, it is useless to private projects.
In short, Rorty suggest that, like “paintbrushes and crowbars,” final and
shared vocabularies are different tools that are best applied to different
tasks. 8 Our rules for public political discourse should continue to reflect
this important insight.
Some claim that a foundation- neutral liberal constitutional order is
just not possible. 9 I have argued elsewhere that it is not only possible, but

Liberalism: Expanded Edition (Colu mbia, 2005), 440-490.
8

Rorty, Contingency, xv i.

9

See, e.g., Wolterstorff, “Why We Should Reject What Liberalis m Tells Us,” 167.
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quite realistic. 10 My aim here, however, is different. My goal is not to
show how justificatory neutrality protected by a strong public-private divide
is possible in the post-secular West, but rather to draw on Rorty’s work to
explain why it remains desirable. I shall begin by saying something about
how Rorty understood the new meaning of liberalism’s public-private
divide in a post-secular West that faces its contingency. In what remains, I
lean on Rorty’s work to offer some reasons why preserving this divide
should continue to be priority for post-secular pluralistic democracies as a
means of avoiding cruelty and promoting solidarity.

I. FACING CONTINGENCY AND THE N EW PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE
Enlightenment liberals took it as at best self-evident 11 and at worst
rationally demonstrable 12 that human beings are free and equal. But the
10

See John P. Anderson, “Law Beyond God and Kant: A Pragmatist Path,” Journal of

Law & Religion (forthcoming, 2017); see also, John P. Anderson, “Trading Truth for
Legit imacy in the Liberal State: Defending John Rawls’s Pragmatis m,” Studies in Law,
Politics and Society 65, 1-29 (2014); John P. Anderson, “Patriotic Liberalis m,” Journal of
Law & Philosophy 22 (2003), 577.
11

See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence (US 1776) (“We hold

these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by th eir
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit
of Happiness.”).
12

See, e.g., John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690, Hackett 1980), 8 (“To
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Enlightenment liberal’s confidence in accessing an objective moral order
that guarantees these core liberal values has been severely shaken, if not
wholly abandoned. 13 As Rorty put it,
Contemporary intellectuals have given up the Enlightenment
assumption that religion, myth, and tradition can be opposed to
something ahistorical, something common to all human beings qua
human. Anthropologists and historians of science have blurred the
distinction between innate rationality and the products of
acculturation. Philosophers such as Heidegger and Gadamer have
given us ways of seeing human beings as historical all the way
through. Other philosophers, such as Quine and Davidson, have
blurred the distinction between permanent truths of reason and
temporary truths of fact….The result is to erase the picture of the

understand political power right, and derive it fro m its o riginal, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in, and that is, as state of perfect freedom…[and] A state also of
equality….”); Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785, Hackett
1993), 36 (“If then there is to be a supreme practical princip le….The ground of such a
principle is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself….The practical imperative will
therefore be the following: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a
means.”).
13

See Anderson, Law Beyond God and Kant.
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self common to Greek metaphysics, Christian theology, and
Enlightenment rationalism: the picture of an ahistorical natural
center, the locus of human dignity, surrounded by an adventitious
and inessential periphery. 14
While some have argued that facing this contingency means the end
of liberalism, Rorty saw it as sign of its maturity. Rorty noted that Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno correctly pointed out in their Dialectic of
Enlightenment15 that “the forces unleashed by the Enlightenment have
undermined the Enlightenment’s own convictions.” 16

From this premise,

Horkheimer and Adorno “drew the conclusion that liberalism was now
intellectually bankrupt, bereft of philosophical foundations, and that liberal
society was morally bankrupt, bereft of social glue.” 17 In reaching this
conclusion, Horkheimer and Adorno assumed that the words the founders of
a historical development use to first articulate their vision must be the
words that describe it correctly, and consequently that the subsequent
dissolution of that terminology must deprive the historical products of the
14

Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in Objectivity,

Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176.
15

Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New

Yo rk: Herder and Herder, 1972).
16

Rorty, Contingency, 56.

17

Id.
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original vision of the right—or even possibility—of continued existence.18
But, according to Rorty, this is almost never the case. 19 Indeed the opposite
is usually true:
the terms used by the founders of a new form of cultural life will
consist largely in borrowings from the vocabulary of the culture
they are hoping to replace. Only when the new form has grown
old, has itself become the target of attacks from the avant- garde,
will the terminology of that culture begin to take form. 20
In other words, Rorty suggested that the final collapse of the
Enlightenment need not spell the end of liberalism. On the co ntrary, it can
signal its weaning from the culture it was striving to replace. It offers
liberalism its opportunity to reach maturity by finally rejecting the
feudalistic tendency to worship a higher authority (whether it be God, the
King, or Universal Reason) in favor of freedom. In short, for Rorty, facing
its contingency should help liberalism substitute freedom for Truth “as the
goal of thinking and of social progress.” 21 Such re- imagination will allow
the West to retain Enlightenment liberalism without Enlightenment

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id., italics added.

21

Id., xiii.
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rationalism. 22
But liberalism’s commitments to freedom, equality, and the publicprivate divide must take on new meaning in this post-secular world. To
begin, where one can no longer rely on a universal moral order imposed
from without, the Enlightenment commitment to freedom as the capacity to
act out of respect for universal moral law (ala Kant 23 ) is replaced by the
commitment to freedom as the ability to engage in the ongoing projects of
self-creation and self-perfection.

Freedom as Self-Invention
For Rorty, freedom in the face of contingency is a matter of se lfinvention. It is reflected in the ongoing and constantly evolving activity of
creating and recreating an original ideal self-description and making it
manifest through action. It is practical poetry. For Rorty, the “hope of such
a poet is that what the past tried to do to her she will succeed in doing to the
past: to make the past itself, including those very causal processes which
blindly impressed all her own behavings, bear her impress.” 24

Rorty

explains that success “in that enterprise—the enterprise of saying ‘Thus I

22

See, id., 57.

23

See, e.g., Kant, Grounding.

24

Rorty, Contingency, 29.
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willed it’ to the past—is success in what [Harold] Bloom calls ‘giving birth
to oneself.’”25
According to Rorty, freedom as self- invention is an end in itself for
members of Western liberal societies. But, facing contingency, he expla ins
that by “end in itself” he means a “project [he] cannot imagine defending on
the basis of noncircular argument.”26

Rorty suggests that writers like

Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Proust, Heidegger, and Nabokov are
exemplars “of what private perfection—self-created, autonomous, human
life—can be like.”27

But one needn’t be a genius or even artistically

inclined to engage in this project. For Rorty, the intellectual, “the person
who uses words or visual or musical forms” in her private pursuit of selfperfection, “is just a special case.”28 The intellectual is
just somebody who does with marks and noises what other people
do with their spouses and children, their fellow workers, the tools
of their trade, the cash accounts of their businesses, the possessions
they accumulate in their homes, the music they listen to, the sports
they play or watch, or the trees they pass on their way to work.
Anything from the sound of a word through the color of a leaf to
25

Id., 29.

26

Id., 64 at n. 24.

27

Id., xiv .

28

Id., 37.

30-Nov-16]

PAINTBRUSHES AND CROWBARS

13

the feel of piece of skin can, as Freud showed us, serve to
dramatize and crystallize a human being’s sense of self- identity.
For any such thing can play the role in an individual life which
philosophers have thought could, or at least should, be played only
by things which were universal, common to us all….Any
seemingly random constellation of such things can set the tone of a
life.

Any such constellation can set up an unconditional

commandment to whose service a life may be devoted—a
commandment no less unconditional because it may be intelligible
to, at most, only one person. 29
29

Id. For another account of freedom that faces contingency, see George Kateb’s list

of “sentiments of democrat ic self-assertion”:
(1) the wish to be different; the wish to be unique; the wish to go off in one’s own
direction; the wish to experiment, to wander, to float;
(2) the wish to be let alone; the wish to be uninvolved in somebody else’s game; the
wish to be unobserved; the wish to be mysterious, to have secrets, to be thought
undefined;
(3) the wish to be unbeholden; the wish to own oneself;
(4) the wish to think, judge, and interpret for oneself;
(5) the wish to feel real, not dazed; the wish to live, not play just one lifelong role or
perform just one lifelong function;
(6) the wish to go to one’s limit; the wish to score, to accumulate heterogeneous
experiences;

14
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From Freedom to Equality and the New Public-Private Divide
The exercise of this freedom demands a zone of privacy in which
individuals have the opportunity to pursue these all- important projects
without undue interference, and in an environment conducive to self-respect.
This zone of privacy must therefore be policed and protected by a public
constitutional order 30 that, to respect the liberal commitment to equality, is

(7) the wish to shape one’s life, but not into a well-shaped story, or a well-made work
of art; the wish to be fluid, not substantial;
(8) the wish to find oneself, to find the ‘real me’; to be oneself rather than s omebody
else’s idea of that self; the wish to be reborn as oneself.
“Democratic Individuality and the Meaning of Rights ,” in Liberalism and the Moral Life,
ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Harvard Un iversity Press, 1989) 183, 191.
30

This commit ment to a zone of privacy is articulated and recognized in a nu mber of

U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In Bowers v. Hardwick , Justice Blackmun exp lains that the
right to privacy both decisional and special aspects: “In construing the right to privacy, the
Court has proceeded along two somewhat distinct, albeit complementary lines. First, it has
recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for the
individual to make. Second, it has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain
places without regard for the particular activit ies in which the individuals who occupy
them are engaged.” 478 U.S. 186, 203-204 (1986) (d issenting) (internal citations omitted).
The Court has recognized that the right to privacy is just part of the broader “right to be let
alone.” Ol mstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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justified in terms all citizens can be expected to accept. 31 Rawls refers to
this requirement of justificatory neutrality as the liberal principle of
reciprocity.32

But in the post-secular West, articulating the scope and

justifying the enforcement of this zone of privacy is a very different project
from that of self-creation, and one that demands talents and methods of a
different sort.
Rorty distinguishes writers who focus on the private pursuits of selfcreation and self-perfection from writers like Mill, Dewey, Habermas, and
Rawls who focus on equality, justice, and legitimacy. The latter are “fellow
citizens rather than exemplars.” 33 These authors “are engaged in a shared
social effort—the effort to make our institutions and practices more just and

31

See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (“The legitimacy of…legislation depends…on

whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to
religious doctrine.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32

See, e.g., Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, xliv (“our exercise of polit ical

power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political
action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justificat ion for those actions”).
See also, Gerald Gaus, The Order o f Public Reason (Cambridge, 2012), 19 (“to respect
others as free and equal moral persons is to refrain fro m claiming mo ral authority o ver
them to demand that they do what they do not themselves have reason to endorse”);
Abdullahi Ahmen An-Na’Im, Islam and the Secular State (Harvard, 2008), 127.
33

Rorty, Contingency, xiv.
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less cruel.”34 Rorty goes on that we “shall only think of these two kinds of
writers as opposed if we think that a more comprehensive philosophical
outlook would let us hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and
human solidarity, in a single vision.”35 Again, if it has done anything,
facing contingency in the post-secular West should force liberals to
recognize this is not possible. According to Rorty, the closest we will ever
come “to joining these two quests is to see the aim of a just and free society
as letting its citizens be as privatistic, irrationalist, and aestheticist as they
please so long as they do it on their own time—causing no harm to others
and using no resources needed by those less advantaged.” 36
So, for Rorty, it is best to think of the relation between writers who
offer reasons in support of projects of self-creation and writers who offer
reasons in support of social justice and equality “as being like the relation
between two kinds of tools—as little in need of synthesis as are
paintbrushes and crowbars.”37 Rorty explains,
One sort of writer lets us realize that the social virtues are not the
only virtues, that some people have actually succeeded in
recreating themselves. We thereby become aware of our own half34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.
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articulate need to become a new person, one whom we as yet lack
words to describe. The other sort reminds us of the failure of our
institutions and practices to live up to the convictions to which we
are already committed by the public, shared vocabulary we use in
daily life….Both are right, but there is no way to make both speak
a single language. 38
The task of the public-private divide in a post-secular society is to ensure
these tools are applied to their proper purpose.
To summarize, Rorty insisted that maintaining a strong publicprivate divide that excludes vocabularies of self-creation (i.e., the religious,
racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, philosophical, and other commitments with
which citizens build their most intimate self-conceptions) from public
political justification under the foundation-neutral model is crucial to
meeting liberalism’s dual goals of respecting freedom and equality in a
post-secular world. To fully appreciate why maintaining the divide is so
important; we need to understand the different and incommensurable roles
the values of freedom and equality play in a liberal society that faces its
contingency. When we give up on the Enlightenment idea of capturing a
theory of freedom and equality in a single comprehensive doctrine that is
authoritative for all humans as such, then freedom as the pursuit of self38

Id., xiv -xv .
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perfection, and equality as the recognition that this freedom must be ordered
so as to show equal respect, each require separate justifications.
Justifications for private projects of self-creation can be as foundational,
comprehensive and as aestheticist as one pleases, but the public effort to
order these private projects pursuant to the liberal commitment to equality
must be uncontroversial, which, in a society that faces contingency, means
it must be foundation- neutral.

In short, freedom plays a private role;

equality plays a public role; and contingency forces us to recognize that
these roles must be separate and distinct to be successful. But isn’t this just
a bunch of esoteric philosophical quibbling? One might wonder what,
precisely, is the harm that would result from leveling this divide? Rorty
was convinced that allowing final vocabularies to openly vie for, and justify
the use of, political power would inevitably humiliate citizens and
undermine solidarity. This is the focus of the next two sections.

II. FREEDOM AND HUMILIATION
Rorty pointed out that while humans and other animals all share the
capacity to feel pain, humans can “be given a special kind of pain: They can
all be humiliated by the forcible tearing down of the particular structures of
language and belief in which they were socialized (or which they pride
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themselves on having formed themselves).” 39 Officially justifying the use
of political power by appeal to foundational reasons (religious, racial,
ethnic, sexual, gender, philosophical, or other) that are shared by some but
not all, is one of the most effective means of forcibly tearing down these
structures in a pluralistic society. Such justification humiliates by drawing
political power indiscriminately from all citizens, but exercising it in the
name of only a few, thereby forcing some citizens to be complicit in the
promotion of comprehensive worldviews to which they do not subscribe
and may be adamantly opposed. Such humiliation is unavoidable when the
public-private divide is leveled in favor of the open competition model.
Proponents of open competition may respond that it should make no
difference that a law is officially justified by appeal to, say, Christian
principles, so long as it is neutral in effect. For example, one might argue
that the scope of a constitutional right to equal protection is not changed by
the fact that the framers or judges expressly justify it as deriving from the
New Testament.

But, even if this were true, is there any doubt that a

Muslim, Jew, or atheist would suffer humiliation when forced to avail
herself of a protection so justified? 40 The effect is the same as that of telling

39

Id., 177.

40

The harm is compounded further when such reasons are offered to justify the use of

coercive power against one who does not share them. See, e.g., Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479
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an African American child that she is not harmed by being forced to attend
a different school from whites because the schools are equal in all other
respects. The harm is in the humiliation that results from the segregation
itself, from the state recognition that there are two classes of children.41
The democratic process may itself be free and fair under the open
competition model, but the conclusion of the process tends to yield two
classes of final vocabularies: those that rule (i.e., stand as the official
justification for the exercise of state power) and those that must submit.
The former are empowered, and the latter are rendered powerless and
humiliated. The final vocabularies (religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, gender,
philosophical, or other) that win out in open competition become, for
example, “American,” and those that lose, “Un-American.” Rorty taught us
that people who value freedom do not want to be forcibly redescribed by

N.W. 2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (in denying a lesbian mother custody of her child, a South
Dakota Supreme Court Justice wrote: “Until such time that she can establish, after years of
therapy and demonstrated conduct, that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of
abomination (see Leviticus 18:22), she should be totally estopped from contaminating these
children.”).
41

See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate

them fro m others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”)
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their political institutions in this way. Such redescription is humiliating and
therefore cruel.
In sum, final vocabularies are tools we use as we exercise our
freedom in our private projects of self-creation and self-perfection. When
they are enlisted in the public sphere as justifications for the use of political
power, they risk harm to others by forcibly redescribing them. Even if this
is not the intention, this is the inevitable result. For liberals like Rorty who
see humiliation as one of the worst forms of suffering, avoiding cruelty
means recognizing that final vocabularies are simply the wrong tools for the
job of social justice.

Their role in public political discourse should

therefore be regulated by the new public-private divide.

III. SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND AUTHORITY

Rorty helped us to appreciate another reason why it is important for
Western liberal democracies to maintain a public-private divide as they face
their own contingency. A liberal society is post-secular in part because it
no longer considers itself bound together by the dictates of reason or
religious faith—by the recognition of “unalienable” natural rights or as
being “one nation, under God.” Post-secular societies are instead united by
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“common vocabularies and common hopes.”42 Such solidarity “is not
discovered by reflection but created;”43 it is “made rather than found.” 44
Rorty understood that a strong public-private divide under the foundationneutral model is crucial to forging and reinforcing such solidarity. The
open-competition model, by contrast, is often destructive to solidarity.
Recall that the open competition model faces post-secular
contingency by obliterating the public-private divide and opening public
political discourse to all foundational reasons—whether they be, religious,
racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, philosophical, or other. Though advocates of
the open competition model tend to be guided by the ideals of equal respect,
toleration, and diversity, the model itself cannot be presented or justified in
terms of these ideals. For if the open competition model itself were
justified by appeal to these moral ideals, then some foundational religious
or secular story would be needed about why these ideals and not others
should be privileged, and why open competition is the best means of
achieving them. But if the open competition model itself were ultimately
justified by appeal to some such controversial foundational commitments,
then there would be no true open competition. The model can only
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overcome this paradox by conceiving itself as offering nothing more than a
modus vivendi.45
A modus vivendi is a point of equilibrium at which parties who are
at odds agree to terms for no other reason than that observing those terms is
in their present strategic interest. 46 But since a balance of interest is all that
supports a constitutional order under the open competition model, the rules
and principles it issues carry no independent moral authority. They are
regarded by citizens from what H.L.A. Hart referred to as the “external
point of view.”47 Violating such rules and principles offer “a basis for the
prediction that a hostile reaction will follow . . . [but they do not offer] a
reason for hostility.”48 From this external viewpoint, citizens will also
recognize that, should the present balance of power among competing
worldviews change, the terms of the modus vivendi will change as well.
Such recognition plants suspicion among the parties to the modus vivendi
(different religious, racial, ethic, sexual, gender, philosophical, and other
groups), and creates incentives to find strategic opportunities to increase
their relative power in order to better position themselves for the next round
45
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of bargaining. Parties may even look to incite conflict with or among other
groups to weaken adversaries and garner allies in need of protection. A
predictable result of all this is that the public “us” and “them” orientation
that the open competition model purports to protect will devolve into an
“us” versus “them” mentality. 49 The symbols of the state (e.g., the flag, the
anthem, the pledge of allegiance) eventually come to be seen as symbols of
the dominant group. As such, they are loathed by the marginalized as
symbols of oppression. The hope for solidarity is replaced by rage and
desire for revenge as the nation tears itself apart. Those who endured the
U.S. presidential campaign of 2016 know that this narrative of national
devolution is neither melodramatic nor fanciful.
Rorty recognized the open competition model’s threat to solidarity
in his warnings against “multiculturalism,” “politics of difference,”
“cultural politics,” “politics of recognition,” or “identity politics.”50 For
Rorty, in the name of promoting diversity and protecting difference,
advocates of open competition often end up repudiating the very “idea of a
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national identity, and the emotion of national pride.” 51 For Rorty, in the
context of American politics, this
repudiation is the difference between traditional American
Pluralism and the new movement called multiculturalism.
Pluralism is the attempt to make America what the philosopher
John Rawls calls “a social union of social unions,” a community of
communities, a nation with far more room for difference than
most. Multiculturalism is turning into the attempt to keep these
communities at odds with one another. 52
Rorty was adamant that social progress and social hope presuppose pride in
a national moral identity. A “nation cannot reform itself unless it takes
pride in itself – unless it has an identity, rejoices in it, reflects upon it, and
tries to live up to it.”53 The open competition model is powerless to
articulate such a shared identity. As argued above, it can never yield more
than a modus vivendi. Thus, by obliterating the public-private divide, the
open competition model does little to build solidarity in pluralistic post51
52
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secular constitutional democracies, and may do a great deal to undermine it.
Without solidarity in a shared national identity, there is no shared hope.
Without shared hope, there is no possibility for enduring reform.
Maintaining the public-private divide under the foundation-neutral
model, by contrast, presupposes and therefore encourages the development
of shared vocabularies. The divide’s gate keeping function is to restrict
final vocabularies’ from public political discourse. In other words, if a
political position cannot be articulated in foundation- neutral terms, then it
cannot be offered as a public justification for the exercise of political power.
Proponents of the model have explained the contents of the foundationneutral vocabulary that should be permitted in public political discourse
differently. I have explained it as comprising “free moves” in public
political discourse. 54 John Rawls defined it in terms of “fundamental ideas”
that are “implicit in the public politics culture of a democratic society.” 55
And Rorty related it in terms of a shared national vocabulary comprising
“catchwords” that can be enlisted to “tell inspiring stories about episodes
and figures in [a] nation’s past—episodes and figures to which the country
54
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should remain true.”56 But what makes all these vocabularies foundationneutral is that they are “freestanding;” they can be enlisted to offer political
justifications that are independent of individual citizens’ controversial
foundational commitments. This has a number of consequences for social
solidarity and political authority.
First, the fact that political goals and reforms can only be publicly
advocated by appeal to a shared vocabulary under the foundation- neutral
model incentivizes the expansion and deepening of this shared national
vocabulary. Those who wish to advocate political change (or against it)
must do so by availing themselves of tropes that are accessible within
political society’s shared culture. This may mean drawing on wellestablished national catchwords or shared national memories to justify the
status quo. It may also mean working to literalize metaphorical applications
of those same catchwords and memories (or introducing new ones) to
advocate for reform. 57 Either way, both the conservative and the liberal will
share common ground, and they have incentives to expand and deepen it.
By making shared values, traditions, and histories that are implicit in a
public political culture explicit in a way that is received by others,
participants in political discourse “share that they share” these values,
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traditions, and histories. 58 Through this exercise, a political society
celebrates itself, and this is precisely the stuff that solidarity is made of.
Second, the very effort of checking one’s final vocabulary at the
door when entering the public political sphere signals to others that you
respect them that much, and that you are there to cooperate—not dictate.
This spirit of cooperation and mutual respect makes it easier for parties who
are at odds to soften their positions, making genuine solidarity on a
compromise position more likely.
Third, even if consensus is not achieved (it almost never is), and
there are clear winners and losers in public political discourse, a strong
public-private divide ensures that the loss touches only upon the first-order
rules or principles at stake. The loss is not an exp ress rejection of the
losers’ final vocabulary or private projects of self-creation, as it often would
be under the open-competition model. This avoids humiliation, but it also
helps to keep the losers at the table and lends legitimacy and authority to
even the most controversial of laws or political acts. For, as foundationneutral, even a controversial law or act will have been justified by appeal to
a shared vocabulary, and in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.
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IV. HARD CASES AND THE PARADOX OF O PEN COMPETITION
So far I have drawn upon Rorty’s work to defend a new, postsecular public-private divide, and to argue that leveling that divide and
introducing final vocabularies (religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, gender,
philosophical, or other) into the public political sphere to justify laws and
the exercise of political power can result in cruelty by forced redescription
and undermine solidarity among citizens.
As noted above, the negative effects of the open competition model
are often most keenly felt when the courts decide hard cases by appeal to
controversial foundational commitments. 59 I have found that proponents of
open competition in public political discourse have a common response to
this concern, and it is worth addressing here. Focusing on the distinction
between deliberation and decision, they argue that while judges should be
free to openly enlist their religious or secular foundational commitments in
their deliberations, once the decision is reached, these commitments should
then be cleansed from the published decision. For example, though Michael
Perry vigorously defends the position that judges should be free to rely on
their controversial moral and religious beliefs in deliberation, he
recommends that they refrain from expressing these beliefs in their
decisions:
59

See supra Section II.
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Even when, in the “hard” case, there may be no apparent alternative
for a judge to give a controversial moral belief as an element—her
justification—of her decision, my suggestion is not that she also give
the controversial belief (perhaps religious) that in her view supports
the controversial moral belief, much less that she undertake a
theological or philosophical defense of the supporting belief. 60
A version of this approach has been advocated by virtually 61 every
proponent of open competition, including Stephen Carter, 62 Kent
Greenawalt, 63 Sanford Levinson, 64 and Mark Modak-Truran. 65
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There are two reasons why it is perplexing that proponents of open
competition would recommend that judges cleanse their published decisions
of any reference to the foundational commitments that ultimately justify the
result.
First, one of the principal arguments offered in favor of open
competition (and against the public-private divide I have advocated) is that
there are not sufficient foundation-neutral reasons to support deliberation
and justify a decision with respect to difficult constitutional issues.
Opening deliberation to foundational commitments, it is argued, will
resolve this problem. With this in mind, however, the suggestion that a
judge separate her deliberation of such important constitutional issues from
her published decision makes no sense. If, on the one hand, deliberation
and decision cannot be achieved absent appeal to foundational
commitments, how is one to make heads or tails of the published decision
absent expression of these commitments? If, on the other hand, the
judgment can be fully justified and explained by appeal to foundationneutral reasons in the published decision, then the criticism that a public

convictions in their written opinions (the process of deliberation),” as the “religionist separationist model.” He defends this model in “Reenchanting the Law,” 720.; see also
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political culture’s shared vocabulary is insufficiently rich to decide such
cases falls flat.
It is no help to defenders of open competition to suggest that the
published decision will be justified by appeal to black- letter law and legal
precedent alone, for this would not help the judge in filling the gap of legal
indeterminacy in hard cases. Alternatively, one could effect the separation
of deliberation and decision by leaving justificatory gaps in the published
decision where the justification was provided by a controversial
foundational commitment, but such justificatory gaps would warrant
suspicion of (and speculation at) the judge’s motives, thereby placing the
legitimacy of the decision in jeopardy. Faced with this risk, the defenders of
open competition would be better served by candor.
The second problem for proponents of open competition who
recommend that judges deliberate by appeal to final vocabularies but
exclude any reference to foundational commitments in their published
opinions is that this strategy is self-defeating. If open competition among
competing religious and moral foundational commitments is such a good
thing, why should it be constrained where it matters most—in the actual
published justification for the exercise of the coercive power of the state?
Kent Greenawalt suggests the requirement that foundational commitments
be excluded from published decisions is explained by the fact that such
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opinions are “supposed to refer only to what is legally relevant.” 66 And,
according to Greenawalt, “[w]hat is legally relevant is generally conceived
to be the same for all judges, so neither personal religious convictions nor
any other idiosyncratic convictions are legally relevant.” 67 But this can’t be
the correct justification because it does not explain the exclusion of
foundational commitments from published justification in hard cases where
everyone understands that the law is indeterminate and the judge may be
required to fill the gap by appeal to extra- legal reasons. One of the
principal goals of open competition is to bring out into the open what was
once hidden from the public, namely the foundational commitments that
were purportedly deciding cases and legislation. Excluding foundational
commitments from published decisions because they do not look like
“legal” justifications is inconsistent with this goal.
Some proponents of open competition have justified the demand that
foundational commitments be excluded from judicial decisions based on the
Establishment clause of the First Amendment. 68 This justification is
unsatisfying for a number of reasons. To begin, a number of proponents of
open competition dispute the claim that the Establishment clause should be
66
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read to exclude religious values from official justification. 69 But, more
importantly, if the Establishment clause were an obstacle to complete
implementation of open competition in the United States, proponents of that
model should be arguing that this fact gives Americans a reason for
amending or reinterpreting this clause.
Ultimately, one is left with the suspicion that there is another reason
why proponents of the open competition model suggest that judges exclude
final vocabularies from their published justifications. It is because they are
good liberals and recognize, with Rorty, that publicly justifying the exercise
of coercive power in terms of controversial foundational commitments
would cruelly redescribe citizens who do not share those commitments and
would undermine the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect that has
historically informed the liberal principle of reciprocity. But if this is the
true justification for the exclusion, then is this commitment to the liberal
reciprocity foundational or freestanding? If it is foundational, then it seems
the proponent of open competition will be forced to defend a single
comprehensive liberal conception of justice—and she is therefore not really
open to competition, but is rather resorting to an Enlightenment
universalism to restrict access to public political discourse. If, on the other
hand, the justification is freestanding, then, at the end of the day, there
69
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appears to be little that separates supporters of open competition from those
who defend foundation-neutrality in the form of a strong public-private
divide—the former reducing to the latter.

CONCLUSION
In an often-quoted passage, Rorty wrote that “J.S. Mill’s suggestion
that governments devote themselves to optimizing the balance between
leaving people’s lives alone and preventing suffering seems to me pretty
much the last word.”70 I have tried to show why, for Rorty, maintaining a
strong public-private divide that cordons off final vocabularies—the
religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, philosophical, and other terms that
are so important for citizens’ private pursuits of self-creation and selfperfection—from public political discourse is a crucial means to
accomplishing both of these goals in post-secular liberal democracies.
Public political justifications should instead be articulated in the foundationneutral terms of a shared national vocabulary.

Like paintbrushes and

crowbars, final and shared vocabularies are different tools for different
purposes, and a strong public-private divide helps ensure that no harm
comes from their misuse.
The 2016 U.S. presidential campaign placed identity politics at
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center stage, and it was the most divisive in the nation’s history. Days after
Donald Trump shocked the world by winning the election, a law professor
tweeted a passage from Achieving Our Country in which Rorty warned that
if America continued on its post-secular tack of leveling liberalism’s
traditional public-private divide in favor of the politics of difference,
“something will crack”:
The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed
and start looking around for a strongman to vote for—someone
willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats .
. . and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. 71
This passage was retweeted thousands of times and generated a run on the
book. Amazon sold out in a few days, and The New York Times, in an
article titled “Richard Rorty’s 1998 Book Suggested Election 2016 Was
Coming,” reported that Harvard University Press was planning to reprint the
book for the first time since 2010. 72 Though Rorty’s concerns went largely
unheeded at the close of the twentieth century, people are listening now.
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